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Infrastructure investment on the margins of the market: The 
role of niche infrastructure providers in the UK 
 
Abstract 
Across Europe, policymakers and market forces are striving to deploy next generation access 
(NGA) networks and ensure ubiquitous access to superfast broadband services. Due to scale 
economies and sunk costs, the roll-out of NGA is expected to be profitable only for large-scale 
providers and in densely populated areas. Nonetheless, alternative providers, such as utilities and 
local communities, have significantly contributed to NGA diffusion in many countries. Over the past 
five years, several small-scale initiatives have emerged in the UK, bringing fibre networks to urban 
and rural areas previously overlooked by either commercial or subsidised deployments. A multiple 
case study approach is employed here to explore the nature and the drivers of niche providers in the 
UK NGA market.  All these initiatives are demand-driven and to follow a modular approach. Despite 
adopting different business models, they all rely on the resources inherited from past broadband 
initiatives and relationships with local partners. By investigating the strategies of niche providers in 
NGA market, this analysis sheds light on their contribution to bridging the digital divide in the UK 
and is presented as a preliminary assessment of their sustainability and potential growth. 
Keywords: 
Alternative broadband providers; niche strategies; digital divide; digital inclusion; broadband 
policy; UK  
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1. Introduction 
The considerable opportunities of digitisation require an infrastructure capable of providing faster 
and more reliable connections (Broadband Commission, 2015). Basic broadband1 is no longer 
sufficient to support the rising consumption of data and to satisfy the increasing hunger for bandwidth 
(Ericsson, 2013). However, in 2016, 26% of the European premises were unable to access either 
superfast2 or ultrafast3 broadband (EC, 2017). With 72% of premises unserved by next generation 
access (NGA)4 networks (EC, 2016), rural areas are the most likely to be digitally divided (Townsend, 
Sathiaseelan, Fairhurst, & Wallace, 2013). 
As a consequence, public authorities are increasingly committed to promote the development of 
NGA  networks, as only the interplay between public and private operators is expected to provide the 
optimal level of coverage and speed (Falch & Henten, 2010; ITU, 2012). Nonetheless, the potential 
contribution of other organisations, such as utilities and local communities, has been highlighted due 
to their historic role in supporting broadband development (Analysis Mason, 2011; Mölleryd, 2015; 
Ragoobar, Whalley, & Harle, 2011). 
The development of NGA in the United Kingdom exemplifies how the interaction between public 
and private parties in broadband market has evolved over the past twenty years. The focus of public 
intervention shifted from access regulation (Nardotto, Valletti, & Verboven, 2015; Ruhle, Brusic, 
Kittl, & Ehrler, 2011) to the subsidisation of NGA investment (DCMS, 2011). The combination of 
private investment and public subsidies is expected to deliver superfast broadband to 95% of UK 
premises by 2017 (Hirst & Sutherland, 2015). In this context, though, numerous small-scale 
infrastructure providers have emerged across the UK to build fibre networks in underserved rural and 
urban areas (PRISM, 2014). 
Such initiatives are increasingly drawing the interest of policymakers and practitioners because of 
their potential contribution to NGA diffusion in the UK (Ofcom, 2015b). Accordingly, this paper 
explores the nature and the strategies of these new infrastructure providers, to shed light on their 
implications for NGA development and their interaction with public and private initiatives. With this 
in mind, Section 2 reviews the literature on the drivers of broadband investment and, in particular, 
the role of alternative providers, while Section 3 investigates the rationales for these initiatives. The 
                                                          
1 Basic broadband provides a download speed between 2 and 30 Mbit/s and is delivered through DSL on copper wires. 
2 In this paper we adopt Ofcom’s definition of superfast broadband, namely, providing a download speed of 30Mbit/s or 
higher. The UK government, instead, defines superfast broadband as providing a minimum download speed of 24 
Mbit/s.  
3 According to Ofcom’s definition, ultrafast broadband delivers a download speed of 300 Mbit/s or higher. 
4 NGA networks deliver superfast or ultrafast broadband through a mix of copper and fibre (FTTC, fibre to the cabinet) 
or end-to-end fibre connections (FTTH/P, fibre to the home or premise). 
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methodology is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the four case studies, which are compared 
and discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are made and policy recommendations suggested in 
Section 7. 
 
2. A theoretical framework for broadband development 
A considerable amount of research has explored the factors affecting the development of 
broadband access networks (Avenali, Matteucci, & Reverberi, 2010; Grubesic & Murray, 2004; 
NESTA, 2015). NGA investment is expected to be viable only for a limited number of large-scale 
operators (Elixmann, Ilic, Neumann, & Plückebaum, 2008) focusing on the most densely populated 
areas (Grubesic, 2008). However, the incumbents might have an incentive to delay their investment 
unless they are exposed to the competitive pressure of other infrastructure providers such as cable 
operators (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013).  
Due to this lack of competition and the externalities typical of network industries, a market failure 
exists in the provision of NGA networks (Gómez-Barroso & Pérez-Martínez, 2005). As a result, both 
incumbents and their competitors tend to invest only in urban areas, as the scale economies in network 
roll-out are a major deterrent to private investment outside cities (Glass & Stefanova, 2012). Rural 
areas can even experience an internal digital divide due to the excessive costs of connecting 
geographically dispersed premises (Rendon Schneir & Xiong, 2016). Where the market fails to 
provide universal access to broadband, public intervention is expected to complement private 
investment (Cave & Martin, 2010) through a variety of measures, such as access, regulation, demand 
aggregation or financial subsidies (Frieden, 2013; Gillett, Lehr, & Osorio, 2004) 
Consistently, extant literature generally frames the development of NGA networks as relying upon 
the interplay between public and private players (Falch & Henten, 2010; Gomez-Barroso & Feijoo, 
2010). However, often crucial has been the contribution of third-party players, that are alternatives to 
both telecommunications companies and public organisations (Tadayoni & Sigurðsson, 2007). Since 
the early 2000s, utilities, communities of end-users and private investors such as property developers 
have actively promoted the roll-out of fibre networks often focusing on small-scale projects 
(Nucciarelli, Sadowski, & Achard, 2010; Ragoobar et al., 2011; Salemink & Bosworth, 2014). The 
characteristics and strategies of these alternative providers are discussed, albeit briefly, in the 
following three sub-sections. 
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2.1 Utilities 
Since the telecommunications market was liberalised, utilities have provided long-distance and 
access networks (Falch & Henten, 2008), either through vertically integrated subsidiaries or in 
partnership with retail ISPs (FTTH Council Europe, 2015). Their entry into the broadband market 
has been mainly driven by the synergies existing in the roll-out and management of networks 
(Tadayoni & Sigurðsson, 2007): utilities could leverage their large customer base and reuse existing 
infrastructures to significantly reduce the costs of NGA deployment (Angelou & Economides, 2013; 
Gillett, Lehr, & Osorio, 2006). Public ownership has been another driver of the involvement of local 
utilities in the broadband market (Troulos & Maglaris, 2011), but also private companies, such as 
Dong in Denmark, have invested in NGA (Mölleryd, 2015). 
Overall, the entry of utilities has been assessed positively as an enabler of investment and 
competition in broadband market (Ford, 2007; Troulos & Maglaris, 2011). However, their actual 
contribution to NGA diffusion has varied widely across developed countries. In the UK, their role 
has been negligible and scarcely successful, allegedly because of the limited involvement of public 
authorities in utility sectors (Ragoobar et al., 2011). More broadly, their influence has diminished 
over time across Europe, after most of their networks have been acquired by telecommunications 
companies5. Nevertheless, new projects involving utilities have been recently announced6, thereby 
suggesting that their involvement should be reconsidered in future. 
 
2.2 Community networks7 
Initially aimed at building cooperative Wi-Fi networks (Sandvig, 2004), community-led initiatives 
have also been undertaken in the fixed broadband market. For example, Guifi.net and OnsNet run 
FTTH networks financed and deployed by local residents in rural Catalonia (Spain) and Nuenen 
(Netherlands), respectively (Domingo, Van der Wee, Verbrugge, & Oliver, 2014; Sadowski, 
Nucciarelli, & de Rooij, 2009). These infrastructures are generally owned by non-profit cooperatives, 
which may either self-provide the retail services or partner with independent ISPs to do so (Plunkett 
Foundation & Carnegie UK Trust, 2012).  
Community-led initiatives have proved to represent a valid alternative to commercial and public-
funded deployments, especially in rural areas (Domingo et al., 2014; Heery & White, 2013), but their 
                                                          
5 For example, the Danish incumbent acquired the FTTH networks deployed by Dong and other power utilities.  
6 For example, Enel has started the roll-out of FTTB in 224 Italian cities.  
7 Community networks may indicate infrastructure deployed and financed by either local authorities or groups of end-
users. In this paper, we adopt the latter definition. 
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long-term sustainability is still unclear. The success of these initiatives is deemed to rely on the 
dedication of volunteers and their capacity to involve other individuals (Middleton & Crow, 2008) as 
well as the technical skills within the communities, the leadership of local champions and the sense 
of commitment to the community (Wallace, Vincent, Luguzan, & Talbot, 2015).  
As suggested by Wallace et al. (2015), successful community networks are likely to be acquired 
by major providers  – for example, Reggefiber is now the majority stakeholder of OnsNet (Nucciarelli 
et al., 2010). On the other hand, initiatives like Guifi.net remain independent, thereby proving that 
community networks can develop without being incorporated by commercial operators. 
 
2.3 Private companies from outside the telecommunications industry 
Private investors from other industries – such as real estate and construction companies – have 
often partnered with telecommunications operators (Nucciarelli et al., 2010) and local authorities 
(Troulos & Maglaris, 2011), to act as facilitators of NGA deployment (Ragoobar et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, several private companies have also independently invested in fibre networks, with the 
most noteworthy example being Google, who launched its own FTTH project in 2010.  
As a vertically integrated triple-play provider, GoogleFiber (2017) is serving ten cities across the 
United States, including Kansas City, Austin, Provo, Charlotte, Nashville and Atlanta. Its expansion 
has been based on both greenfield deployments and the acquisition of existing networks (Davidson 
& Santorelli, 2014). The deployments were entirely funded by Google, but local authorities and 
utilities have often provided indirect support by exempting right of ways fees (Trogdon, 2013) and 
giving access to existing passive infrastructures (Baumgartner, 2016). However, the FTTH project 
has recently been suspended, as Google is presumably going to focus on wireless networks 
(Telegeography, 2016). 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the 
alternative broadband providers according to extant literature. The different drivers and strategies of 
these initiatives are reflected in their scope and objectives. Profit-oriented providers are unlikely to 
serve socially deprived areas (Halegoua, 2015). Community-led projects, in contrast, are more likely 
to enhance social inclusion and foster socio-economic development (Ashmore, Farrington, & 
Skerratt, 2015; Salemink & Strijker, 2016). In both cases, alternative providers leapfrog the ladder of 
investment (Cave, 2006) to become fully independent from the legacy networks (Crandall, Eisenach, 
& Ingraham, 2013).  
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Table 1: Drivers and strategies of alternative NGA providers 
 Utilities Communities Other private investors 
Drivers • Economies of scope (Gillett 
et al., 2006; Tadayoni & 
Sigurðsson, 2007)  
• Public ownership (Troulos 
& Maglaris, 2011) 
• Commitment of community 
members (Middleton & 
Crow, 2008) 
• Technological, relational, 
human, financial and 
identity capital (Wallace et 
al., 2015) 
• Partnership with telco and 
municipalities  
• Reuse of existing 
infrastructures 
(Baumgartner, 2016) 
• Indirect public support 
(Trogdon, 2013) 
Technology • FTTH+wireless • FTTH+wireless • FTTH 
Geographic 
scope 
• Urban and rural  • Rural  • Urban  
Investment 
model 
• Public company 
• Private company 
• Cooperative • Private company 
• Joint venture 
Business 
Model 
• Vertically integrated  
• Open access  
• Partnership with ISP  
• Vertically integrated  
• Open access  
• Joint-venture 
• Vertically integrated 
Financing 
Model 
• Cross-subsidisation  • Equity from community 
members, loans and grants 
(Heery & White, 2013) 
• Private capital 
 
3. A rationale for alternative infrastructure providers 
Despite acknowledging the contribution of alternative providers to broadband development, extant 
literature did not clarify how these initiatives are related to general theories of broadband 
development. Tadayoni and Sigurðsson (2007) explained the emergence of alternative providers in 
Denmark as a response to the path dependency of traditional operators, whose investment strategies 
are constrained by the legacy infrastructure. The low costs of wireless technology and the support of 
public sector were also identified as major enablers for the entry of new broadband providers.  
In the current scenario, path dependency is emphasised by the choice of incumbents to invest in 
FTTC (Cave & Shortall, 2016), while wireless technologies are unlikely to play a central role in NGA 
market due to their limited bandwidth (KPMG, 2010).  Furthermore, the role of public sector has 
changed significantly over the past decade, with autonomous initiatives of local authorities being 
replaced by top-down interventions coordinated by central governments (Broadband Commission, 
2013).  
As a matter of fact, the entry of small-scale infrastructure providers may be inconsistent with the 
trends in broadband markets and the economics of NGA investment. Further research is therefore 
needed to understand the rationales for alternative infrastructure providers in NGA market. In other 
industries, the entry of small-scale providers is explained by the existence of strategic niches in the 
market. A niche was defined as either “a small part of the market whose needs are not fulfilled” (Shani 
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& Chalasani, 1992, p. 34) or “a protected space where suboptimally performing experiments can 
develop away from regime selection pressures” (Seyfang & Haxeltine, 2012, p. 383). 
The choice of focusing on small-scale markets has been explained as a competitive strategy based 
on market segmentation and product differentiation  (Dalgic & Leeuw, 1994). By adopting a niche 
strategy, market players are able to achieve economies through specialisation (Parrish, Cassill, & 
Oxenham, 2006). On the other hand, the sustainability of this strategy may be endangered if demand 
reduces or stronger competitors enter into the niche, unless the niche operator has market power or 
its product is not replicable (Noy, 2010). 
The theory of strategic niche management, instead, described a market niche as juxtaposed to the 
mainstream market (Levinthal, 1998) and the socio-technological regime (Raven, 2006). Niches 
attempt to resolve the conflicts and intrinsic problems of the socio-technological regime and can 
eventually reshape or replace it (Hargreaves, Hielscher, Seyfang, & Smith, 2013). Nevertheless, their 
small scale and geographically limited focus may hamper the transmission of radical innovation to 
the mainstream market (Seyfang & Smith, 2007). 
As explained in Section 2, alternative NGA providers target a geographically delimited group of 
customers and differentiate their offer in terms of either coverage or speed. In fact, they address a 
niche market resulting from both market and policy failures (Salemink, Strijker, & Bosworth, 2016), 
as private and public players were unable to fully satisfy the demand for faster connectivity. 
Consequently, niche infrastructure providers challenge the status quo in NGA market by providing 
ultrafast broadband where large-scale operators and public initiatives failed to do it.  
Strategic niche management theory suggested that a niche can ultimately replace the mainstream 
market or being incorporated by it (Schot & Geels, 2008). This paper will investigate the drivers 
affecting the entry of alternative NGA providers in the UK market, thereby clarifying the relationship 
between these initiatives and those of traditional players in broadband market. This analysis will 
therefore help to forge an understanding of the rationales and the sustainability of niche strategies in 
a capital-intensive industry. 
 
4. Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to explore the strategies of niche infrastructure providers and explain 
their contribution to NGA development in the UK. For this reason, we employ a multiple case study 
approach that enables both exploratory and explanatory research (Yin, 2014). A multiple case study 
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is also expected to highlight within group similarities and intergroup differences (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
enhancing the reliability and accuracy of the results. 
The analysis focuses on four niche providers in the UK: a community-led project, a private 
operator building FTTH in rural areas, and two private operators deploying fibre networks in urban 
areas. These cases have been selected as they are most relevant and representative of the UK market, 
after an extensive review of sources addressing NGA development. They represent a small yet 
significant sample of alternative infrastructure providers in the UK, exemplifying the variety of 
initiatives that are ongoing in the UK NGA market.  
As shown in Table 2, the four case studies have been analysed in relation to three dimensions: 
their drivers, their investment strategies and their outcome. This framework enables an in-depth 
analysis of the relationship between the exogenous and the endogenous factors affecting the entry 
and the sustainability of niche broadband providers. The interaction between drivers and strategies is 
expected to explain the impact of these initiatives upon the market and shed light on the implications 
for policymakers and practitioners.  
Data have been collected from a series of semi-structured interviews and secondary sources such 
as financial statements, company websites and press releases. Documentary analysis provided an 
overview of the business models and the strategies of niche providers in the UK, while interviews 
focused on their drivers and interactions with other public and private players in NGA market. 
 
Table 2: A framework for the analysis of NGA initiatives  
Drivers Investment Strategy Outcome 
• Supply- side 
• Demand-side 
• Policy 
• Technology 
• Geographic Scope 
• Investment model 
• Business model 
• Financing model 
• Coverage 
• Take-up 
• Speed 
• Price 
Source: derived from Elixmann et al. (2008) and European Commission (2014) 
 
5. Context 
Since the NGA roll-out started in 2009, 89% of UK premises have been covered by superfast 
broadband with a take-up rate of 31%. British Telecom (BT) has brought FTTC to 68% of UK 
premises, investing £2.5 billion, while Virgin Media has deployed DOCSIS 3.08 to 44% of UK 
premises (British Telecom, 2016; Ofcom, 2014). Overall Ofcom (2014) estimated that private 
                                                          
8 The standard enabling cable to provide up to 152 Mbit/s in downlink. 
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investment had delivered NGA to 78% of UK premises, with 35% of them covered by two competing 
networks.  
As shown in Table 3, the UK government has adopted several strategies to expand NGA coverage. 
In 2011, the UK government launched the Superfast Broadband Programme to subsidise private 
investment in rural areas (DCMS, 2011). Under the supervision of Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK)9, 
this initiative is aimed at delivering a minimum download speed of 24 Mbit/s to 95% of premises by 
2017 (Rathbone, 2016). Moreover, seven pilot projects have been undertaken to test alternative 
technologies for the provision of superfast broadband to the hardest-to-reach 5% of premises (DCMS, 
2016). A complementary initiative, Superconnected Cities, sought to increase demand for superfast 
connections, by issuing vouchers to SMEs across 50 UK cities. 
 
Table 3: BDUK programme  
 BDUK 
funding (£m) 
Target Status 
Rural Broadband 
Programme – Phase 1 
530 90% coverage by early 2016 Achieved in April 2016 
Superfast Extension 
Programme – Phase 2 
250 95% coverage by 2017 Underway 
Competitive Fund 10 Pilot projects to identify 
alternative solutions for the final 
5% 
7 pilots completed in March 2016 
Superconnected Cities 150 Vouchers of up to £ 3,000 to help 
SMEs in 50 cities  
55,000 vouchers issued between 
December 2013 and October 2015 
Source: Ofcom (2014, p. 23), DCMS (2016), Rathbone (2016) 
 
BDUK’s funds have been awarded through competitive tenders, managed by the county councils 
and the devolved administrations. In phase 1, all the contracts were won by BT. Other competitors 
like Geo and Fujitsu withdrew from the bidding, being unable to meet BDUK’s requirements 
(Telegeography, 2013). Within Phase 2, BT won the majority of contracts with only eight contracts 
awarded to alternative providers: Call Flow, Gigaclear, UKB Networks and Airband. This lack of 
competition has raised concerns about the suitability of the BDUK framework to maximise the value-
for-money of public investment (Public Accounts Committee, 2014). 
Despite the progress in NGA diffusion, the latest data from Ofcom (2016a) confirmed the 
persistence of a significant digital divide between rural and urban areas (see Table 4). 40% of rural 
premises do not have access to a speed greater than 30 Mbit/s, while 25% of rural households do not 
                                                          
9 Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) is an agency within the Department of Culture, Media and Sports 
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receive a speed greater than 10 Mbit/s. As a result, a reform of the Universal Service Obligation is 
under discussion, to give everyone a broadband connection with a minimum download speed of 
10Mbit/s (Ofcom, 2016b). This is expected to also benefit that 2% of urban premises that could not 
access 10 Mbit/s in 2015 (Ofcom, 2016a).  
Furthermore, Table 4 also shows a gap between the availability and the adoption of superfast 
broadband services, with the latter increasing at a much slower pace. In 2016, superfast broadband 
was available to 89% of the UK premises, but only 31% of them had subscribed to a superfast 
connection. Nevertheless, in BDUK-funded projects the actual take-up rate has generally resulted to 
be higher than expected (Jackson, 2016). 
 
Table 4: Availability and adoption of broadband in the UK (% of premises) 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Coverage 
< 2 Mbit/s – national 14% 10% 8% 4% 2% 1% 
NGA – national  58% 65% 73% 78% n.a. n.a. 
SFBB – national  n.a. n.a. n.a. 75% 83% 89% 
NGA – rural   n.a. 19% 25% 33% n.a. n.a. 
SFBB – rural  n.a. n.a. n.a. 22% 44% 60% 
Take-up SFBB – national  n.a. 7.3% 16% 21% 27% 31% 
Source: Ofcom (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a) 
Alongside the major private and public initiatives, the number of alternative operators actively 
investing in NGA almost doubled between 2010 and 2014, from 34 to 65 respectively (PRISM, 2014). 
The most noteworthy alternative providers have been local communities and developers (Analysis 
Mason, 2011), with utilities historically playing a marginal role in the UK broadband market (BIS, 
2010; Ragoobar et al., 2011).  
In urban areas alternative NGA providers have focused on new-build developments and multi-
dwelling units (MDUs) such as student accommodations (Analysis Mason, 2011). Many of these 
initiatives have been led by companies in the building industry – for example, Quintain and 
Brookfield Utilities, which started Velocity1 and IFNL respectively (Berendt, 2014). 
Community-led initiatives have arguably been flourishing in rural areas since the early 2000s. For 
example, some villages in Lancashire and Cumbria established community Wi-Fi before deploying 
their own FTTH networks (Plunkett Foundation & Carnegie UK Trust, 2012). Some of these 
initiatives have proved to be successful (DCMS, 2016), while other community-led networks have 
recently been either acquired by private operators (for example, Vtesse Networks by Interroute) or 
abandoned (such as Internal Communications Systems in Kent).  
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6. Case studies: alternative NGA providers in the UK 
 
6.1 Broadband for the Rural North (B4RN) 
B4RN is a community benefit society based in rural Lancashire, an area historically provided with 
poor broadband (Lancashire County Council, 2011). Various communities, such as Wray-with-
Botton and Wennington, established their own Wi-Fi networks in the early 2000s. These projects, 
backed by Lancaster University, succeeded in providing broadband to remote areas but were 
constrained by the lack of reliable backhaul. 
The poor quality of existing telecommunication infrastructures was the major driver for local 
residents to build their own fibre network. B4RN was started in 2011 by a group of local citizens, 
championed by Barry Forde, who was previously a manager of several local telecommunications 
providers including LUNS Ltd. The project was expected to break-even at 1,000 connected customers 
and to pay back the investment within 10 years (B4RN, 2013). By November 2016, B4RN has 
connected 2,300 customers to FTTH in 43 parishes. In terms of take-up, on average 65% of homes 
passed have an active connection. 
This project relies on a unique investment strategy. The network roll-out mainly relies upon 
volunteers, who are trained by B4RN in partnership with the equipment suppliers. The participation 
of local residents allows B4RN to lay its infrastructure across farmland, significantly reducing 
deployment costs. The roll-out is started once the residents have collected sufficient funds to cover 
all the premises in their parish. The deployment is based on parishes rather than postcodes. 
Connected customers are charged a non-recurring connection fee of £150 and then £30 per month 
for 1 Gbit/s services. B4RN does not offer bundles with BT landline for voice services, but has a 
commercial partnership with Vonage, a voice over IP (VOIP) provider. Despite being vertically 
integrated, it also provides wireless ISPs with wholesale access to its backhaul network.  
As a community benefit society, B4RN relies mainly on private funds from local investors. By 
November 2016 £4.8 million had been collected from 1,200 shareholders, who are required to invest 
at least £100 (for 100 shares), with the maximum investment set at £100,000. Private and public 
sponsors, like The Forest of Bowland AONB and the Land Rover Countryside Bursary, have also 
supported B4RN through grants and in-kind donations. Furthermore, additional funds have been 
collected from local lenders and through crowd-funding initiatives.  
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To date, no public funds have been awarded to B4RN. Initially the communities explored the 
opportunity of applying to the Rural Community Broadband Fund10 (RCBF) and BDUK funds, but 
the requirements were considered unsuitable for their projects. BT won both the BDUK bids for a 
total amount of £36.3 million (Superfast Lancashire, 2013). The BDUK-funded roll-out has also 
included some of the parishes targeted by B4RN, which were initially excluded from BT’s 
commercial and subsidised plans (Jackson, 2014).  
 
6.2 Cityfibre 
Cityfibre was founded in March 2010 by Greg Mersch and Mark Collins, who had previously been 
involved in the start-up and management of various telecommunications companies. One of these, i3 
Group, built FTTH networks in Bournemouth and Dundee that were bought by Cityfibre in April 
2011 for £4.7 million (Cityfibre, 2011). Over the past six years the company has invested in 40 town 
and cities, by deploying both greenfield fibre networks and taking over existing assets from local 
authorities and other providers, such as Redcentric’s and KCOM’s metro networks (CityFibre 
Infrastructure Holdings plc, 2016). Therefore, the acquisition of existing infrastructure resulted to be 
a major driver of Cityfibre’s geographic expansion.  
Considering their investment strategy, the company builds and operates pure fibre metropolitan 
area networks that are meant to be “a backbone for a future deployment of a gigabit-capable fibre to 
the home access” (Cityfibre, 2015, p. 5). These networks do not serve end-users but enable retail 
providers to deliver broadband services and interconnect with the Internet. Cityfibre has opted for an 
open access business model, and by December 2016 it had partnered with 54 local and national ISPs.  
The main source of revenues is the provision of dark fibre, but the turnover from active services 
is increasing11. Furthermore, Cityfibre is a major supplier of fibre links to the towers of mobile 
network operators like Vodafone and EE. The networks are usually designed according to the demand 
and needs of potential customers in the served cities, who are required to register their interest to be 
included in the network route. Anchor contracts with ISPs and the public sector enable Cityfibre to 
almost completely cover the initial investment, maximising the gross margins of network 
deployments.  
                                                          
10 A scheme of £ 20 million, jointly financed by DEFRA and BDUK, initially intended to provide superfast broadband to 
the hardest-to-reach premises. 
11  ISP can purchase either passive access (such as dark fibre) or active access services. The former requires the ISP to 
employ its own equipment to provide data services, while the latter include both the physical infrastructures and the 
data services. 
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Cityfibre is entirely financed by private capital and has been listed on the London Stock Exchange 
since January 2014. As of September 2016, it had a stock market capitalisation of more than £160 
million. Investing in urban areas, Cityfibre is not eligible for public subsidies but it has qualified for 
debt guarantees under HM Treasury’s Infrastructure UK scheme. Generally, it has a strong interaction 
with the public sector, since local authorities and other public agencies are often anchor tenants in 
Cityfibre’s projects. In several cities, such as York and Peterborough, the local councils have been 
actively promoting and endorsing Cityfibre’s deployment as a key component of their digital 
strategies and Smart City projects. 
Being a wholesale-only operator Cityfibre is not directly involved in the retail market. However, 
Cityfibre Infrastructure Holdings also owns Gigler, a retail FTTH provider based in Bournemouth. 
Moreover, it holds a 33% stake in Bolt Pro Tem Ltd, a joint venture with Sky and TalkTalk for the 
roll-out of FTTH in York. As of September 2016, 14,000 premises had been passed (Cityfibre, 2016). 
In spite of its limited coverage, this project highlights Cityfibre’s potential contribution to the 
diffusion of ultrafast broadband, by providing a pure fibre network that competes with BT’s 
infrastructure. 
 
6.3 Gigaclear plc 
Founded in 2010 by Matthew Hare, the former CEO of Community Internet Group, Gigaclear plc 
builds FTTP networks in rural areas unserved by major providers and excluded by public 
interventions. Some of the served villages had previously established their own community networks, 
which have been later taken over by Gigaclear. Rutland Telecom’s FTTC network was bought in May 
2011 for £200,000, while Cotswolds Broadband C.I.C, a FTTP and fixed-wireless community 
provider, was acquired in December 2015 for £106,000. 
Unlike these community-led projects, Gigaclear is a for-profit company and does not involve local 
residents in the funding and roll-out of the network. However, it works in partnership with local 
campaigners and businesses to raise broadband awareness and aggregate demand. In fact, unsatisfied 
demand is a major driver for Gigaclear, which invests only in ‘qualified communities’ with a 
minimum level of customer pre-orders ensuring a first-year project return of over 10%. On average, 
the percentage of pre-registered customers is 28% and the return on each project is expected to be 
over 20%, with a payback period of 5 years. 
With regard to its business model, Gigaclear serves both residential and business users with 
superfast broadband, while voice services are provided in partnership with Vonage. Despite being 
vertically integrated, Gigaclear’s networks are open to other ISPs. Currently the company has 
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commercial relationships with an ISP aggregator, two wireless ISPs, and three ISPs focused on the 
business segment. 
The company is entirely owned by private shareholders. The main shareholders are Woodford 
Investment Fund and Prudential Infracapital, with an equity investment of £24 million and £20 
million respectively. A £18 million loan has been secured from the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
in January 2016. Furthermore, Gigaclear has won public funds from five local authorities – see Table 
5. The first contract was awarded by the parish of Northmoor in March 2014. In each project, the 
public funds have been matched with a significant investment from Gigaclear (up to £4 for every £1 
of aid). 
 
Table 5: Public funds awarded to Gigaclear 
Local authority 
Public funding Gigaclear 
investment 
Premises to 
cover 
Cost per household 
passed by FTTH Amount Source 
Northmoor £186,000 RCBF £247,600 542 £800 
Berkshire £3.7 million 
BDUK +  
Local authority 
£16 million 11,700 £1,684 
Essex £2 million 
BDUK +  
Local authority 
£5.5 million 4,500 £1,667 
Gloucestershire and 
Herefordshire 
£3 million 
BDUK +  
Local authority 
£7 million 6,495 £1,540 
Devon and Somerset £39.50 million 
BDUK +  
Local authority 
£43.75 
million 
35,225 £2,363 
Source: compiled by the authors from data provided by Gigaclear and Jackson (2015) 
 
In terms of coverage, as of December 2015, the company owned and operated 56 FTTP networks 
in 11 counties (Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Gloucester, Hertfordshire, Kent, 
Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland, West Berkshire), with 35 more networks 
under construction. In December 2015 the homes passed by Gigaclear totalled 15,000 with an average 
take-up rate of 36%. Generally, the deployments include all the premises in a village, but the hardest-
to-reach premises may be required to subsidise the roll-out (Palmer, 2016). 
Gigaclear’s projects have focused on rural areas previously excluded by either private or public 
NGA investment. Nevertheless, as experienced by B4RN, the entry of Gigaclear led BT to amend its 
FTTC investment plan. The company estimates that 45% of its networks have been partly overbuilt 
by BT (Gigaclear, 2016). 
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6.4 Hyperoptic 
Hyperoptic was founded in 2010 by Dana Tobak and Boris Ivanovic, entrepreneurs with long-
standing experience of broadband markets. In 2005 they started BE Un Limited, the first ADSL2+ 
provider in the UK (BBC News, 2013), while Boris Ivanovic had previously launched BoStream, a 
FTTP provider in Sweden (O’Dwyer, 2004).  
Hyperoptic rolls out FTTP networks to urban multi-dwelling buildings (that include 50 or more 
units). It works in partnership with developers, property managers and housing associations to install 
fibre in either existing or new properties. Unlike other niche providers, Hyperoptic’s investment 
strategy does not rely on an independent passive infrastructure but focuses instead on the roll-out of 
point-to-point fibre wiring into end-users’ premises. 
The installation of fibre into the target building starts once 10% of residents have registered their 
interest. However, this does not imply either an upfront payment or an exclusivity requirement. 
Residential and business users can choose between 20Mbps, 100Mbps and 1Gbps offers. Further 
tailored services for businesses have been launched since March 2015 and a ‘no contract’ option for 
new customers has been made available. 
Considering its financial mix, Hyperoptic is entirely financed privately. In May 2013 Quantum 
Strategic Partners Ltd became a major shareholder after investing £50 million in the company. A £21 
million loan was secured from the European Investment Bank in July 2016, to serve an additional 
300,000 premises in three years. Being focused on urban areas, Hyperoptic has not benefitted from 
public funds for fibre deployment but has partnered with the Connection Vouchers Scheme to deliver 
subsidised superfast broadband to SMEs. 
Since 2011 Hyperoptic has deployed FTTP networks to MDUs building across 13 cities: 
Birmingham, Brighton, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Nottingham, Reading and Sheffield. New deployments are expected in Portsmouth, 
Watford, Leicester, Southampton, Slough, Edinburgh and Woking. Being focused on single buildings 
rather than widespread deployments, the overall coverage of Hyperoptic is still limited but the 
company aims to deliver FTTP to 500,000 premises by 2018. The take-up rate has varied across the 
served buildings, depending on the availability of other superfast broadband services, though the 
average is 30% one year after the network has been installed. 
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7. Discussion 
Table 6 illustrates the heterogeneous nature and target of alternative NGA providers in the UK. 
Each provider addresses a specific niche in the market, defined by the gap between the demand and 
the supply of connectivity. Such a gap can be measured in terms of either broadband coverage or 
network performance. In the former case, the niche providers target those geographic areas where 
both the market and the public players have failed to provide either superfast or ultrafast broadband. 
In the latter case, the niche providers complement the existing supply of superfast broadband by 
delivering ultrafast broadband where a demand for faster and more reliable connectivity exists.  
The differences between and within the niches have required these providers to implement 
different strategies. Cityfibre provides access to its metro networks on an open access basis, but 
delivers FTTH through either its retail subsidiary or a joint venture with two major ISPs. Hyperoptic, 
B4RN and Gigaclear are vertically integrated with both rural providers also offering wholesale 
services to other ISPs. Consequently, the case studies suggest that niche providers are likely to adapt 
their business model to the product they offer and the niche they serve. 
 
Table 6: Summary and comparison of the four case studies 
 
B4RN Cityfibre Gigaclear Hyperoptic 
Date of incorporation December 2011 March 2011 December 2010 April 2011 
Geographic focus Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  
Technology FTTH Fibre-only metro 
networks 
FTTH FTTB/H 
Investment model Community-led 
initiative 
Private company Private company Private company 
Business model Retail+wholesale Wholesale only Retail+wholesale Retail only 
Financial mix Local 
shareholders+debt 
Listed on AIM+debt Financial investors 
+EIB loan+BDUK 
Financial investors + 
EIB loan 
Customer target Residential users 
and SMEs 
Public sector, ISPs, 
Mobile operators 
Residential and 
business users 
Residential and 
business users 
Turnover (£000), 31st 
December 2015 
144 6,408 1,369 4,140 
Profit (£000), 31st 
December 2015   
- 47 - 6,362 - 5,996 - 12,210 
Network assets (£000), 
31st December 2015 
1,779 48,712 6,729 8,839 
Geographic scope, 31st 
December 2015 
30 parishes 37 cities 56 communities 13 cities 
Nos. of employees, 31st 
December 2015 
10 83 63 211 
Source: compiled by the authors from data provided by Bureau Van Dijk (2016) 
 
Similarly, the investment model and the financial mix are affected by the geographic focus of the 
initiative. The urban niches are targeted by for-profit ventures funded by financial investors. 
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Gigaclear suggests that even in rural areas there may be a case for private investment, while B4RN’s 
experience has shown that community-led initiatives in remote areas are feasible without public 
subsidies. 
The access to public subsidies is a controversial issue. Gigaclear was awarded five contracts within 
the Superfast Extension Programme, while B4RN failed to obtain any funds from the Rural 
Community Broadband Fund. On the one hand, this might highlight a limitation of community-based 
projects, lacking the skills and the resources to successfully deal with the State Aid procedures. On 
the other hand, the effectiveness of these procedures in promoting competition could be questioned.  
The different nature and scope of these providers are reflected also in their charges – see Figure 1 
and Figure 2. Gigaclear’s services are the most expensive, consistent with the higher deployment 
costs and lower competition in rural areas, while B4RN’s product is the most affordable among 
1Gbit/s offers perhaps due to its non-profit nature. Furthermore, the latter does not differentiate its 
services in terms of bandwidth, presumably to minimise the expenditure for network management 
and billing. Hyperoptic, instead, is the only one providing also a 20 Mbit/s product, to match the 
offering of its competitors in urban areas.  
In any case, these providers offer higher speed than the major ISPs, since neither BT nor Virgin 
Media market a 1 Gbit/s product. Alternative providers are the only ones offering a pure fibre 
infrastructure in the UK, while both commercial and subsidised deployments primarily relying on the 
upgrading of existing copper and coaxial networks. In spite of its higher risks and costs, investment 
in fibre networks is future-proof and likely to generate a competitive advantage for alternative 
providers, especially when compared to traditional broadband providers. However, to date, the 
sustainability of their investment is yet to be proved, as none of the four case studies has been 
profitable.  
Furthermore, none of these niche providers offer triple play bundles. Tadayoni and Sigurðsson 
(2007) identified access to content as a barrier for alternative providers as they lack the resources to 
acquire content themselves. At this stage, the impact of media convergence on the sustainability of 
niche operators is unclear, and requires further assessment. However, the increasing availability of 
online content from OTTs and broadcasters may reduce the competitive advantage of triple-play 
providers.  
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Figure 1: Comparison of broadband-only packages12 as of September 2016 
 
Source: compiled by the authors from data provided by www.uswitch.com 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of double play bundles 13 as of September 2016 
 
Source: compiled by the authors from data provided by www.uswitch.com 
                                                          
12 Average monthly price based on a 12 month contract with unlimited data usage. 
13 Gigaclear’s and B4RN’s fees include £8/month for unlimited landline calls with Vonage. 
  
 
19 
 
With regard to the relationship with the public sector, the experience of niche providers varies 
significantly across the case studies. Gigaclear is the only one to have benefitted from public funds. 
In contrast, B4RN has had a less straightforward interaction with the public sector, limited to the 
release of permits and wayleaves. Local authorities were neither actively involved in the project nor 
provided financial support. 
Being based in urban areas, Hyperoptic and Cityfibre are not eligible for public subsidies but could 
benefit somehow from public initiatives. Hyperoptic joined the Superconnected Cities Voucher 
scheme, that subsidised SMEs to adopt fibre broadband. Cityfibre, in contrast, has often been 
supported by local councils, acting as either anchor customers or ‘evangelists’ promoting its projects 
within the local communities.  
Overall, public support has not been a major driver for the entry of niche providers into the UK 
NGA market, even though it can facilitate their development. Conversely, these initiatives were often 
triggered by the failure of public intervention to provide access to ultrafast broadband. Rural niche 
providers are targeting those communities left behind by BDUK funded projects and unsatisfied with 
the broadband services delivered by BT. In urban areas, the entry of alternative providers might be 
seen as the response to the ineffectiveness of access regulation in pushing fibre roll-out beyond the 
street cabinet. 
The influence of regulation has been negligible for all these initiatives due to their limited reliance 
on regulated services. Initially their interaction with Ofcom was aimed mostly at obtaining ‘Code 
Powers14’ to streamline fibre roll-out. However, the recent appeal of Cityfibre against Ofcom’s 
decision to impose a price cap on BT’s dark fibre (Competition Appeal Tribunal, 2016) highlights 
the potential impact of regulation upon niche providers. By influencing the cost opportunity and the 
return of infrastructure investment, access regulation affects the scope and the sustainability of niche 
strategies in NGA market. The regulator should, therefore, carefully consider the implications of 
access-based regulation for niche providers investing in NGA infrastructure. 
Despite the diversity and complexity of alternative infrastructure projects across the UK, the 
analysis of these four case studies outlined a number of recurring elements across their strategies: the 
leverage of past experiences in broadband market; the implementation of demand aggregation 
mechanisms; the reliance on strategic partnerships; and the adoption of a modular approach to NGA 
                                                          
14 The Electronic Communications Code empowers network providers to build their infrastructure on public land and 
to take rights over private land. Providers with Code Powers can benefit from exemptions under planning legislation 
and carry out street works without applying for a specific licence. 
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deployment. These distinctive features can be identified as key determinants for the entry and the 
sustainability of niche infrastructure providers in the NGA market. 
All these case studies are related, in different ways, to past initiatives in the broadband market.  
Gigaclear, Cityfibre and Hyperoptic have been founded by entrepreneurs with a long experience as 
creators and managers of telecommunications companies. Likewise, some of the communities 
involved in the B4RN project had previously established cooperative Wi-Fi networks. These past 
experiences have endowed the new providers with detailed knowledge of broadband markets and the 
technical know-how needed to manage the risks and complexity of network infrastructure 
investments.  
This expertise has been vital to building trust around the projects, gaining support from financial 
investors and local stakeholders (public authorities, prospective customers, potential suppliers). 
Similarly, the skills within the local communities have been crucial to both the planning and the 
execution of B4RN, which periodically organises free training sessions for the locals to share and 
develop the technical know-how of fibre roll-out. This has enabled B4RN to expand beyond the first 
group of parishes, as technical skills were successfully transferred to new communities. 
Cityfibre and Gigaclear have also sought to leverage past investment in NGA markets by taking 
over extant assets from other providers. Therefore, the existence of underutilised or underperforming 
assets is likely to be a major driver for the entry of niche providers in a specific area. On the other 
hand, this may also limit the geographic diffusion of niche providers, being anchored as they are on 
the footprint of pre-existing networks. 
The location of alternative NGA deployments is also driven by the presence of unsatisfied demand. 
Niche operators target those areas where a demand for faster broadband already exists but has not 
been addressed yet by either commercial or subsidised deployments. Consequently, the case study 
companies have adopted a variety of mechanisms to detect and quantify this potential demand. 
Gigaclear, Cityfibre and Hyperoptic require their prospective customers to pre-register and trigger 
roll-out once a threshold is met. Similarly, B4RN covers a parish only when a sufficient number of 
households have joined and contributed to the project. 
The level of demand aggregation required to commence the investment varies across the four 
initiatives, but the pre-registration is never binding and does not imply an upfront payment. When a 
certain threshold is met, the fibre is usually deployed to any premise, including those who did not 
register. As a result, this mechanism is primarily aimed at estimating the potential of each project and 
engaging with the target community. In contrast, the anchor tenant contracts signed by Cityfibre with 
ISPs and major customers are also apt to minimise the financial risks of the provider. In both cases, 
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demand aggregation is likely to increase broadband awareness, thereby stimulating the adoption of 
broadband services. 
Consistently, niche providers quickly achieved a high take-up rate. Hyperoptic’s uptake is in line 
with the national average in urban areas of 33% (Ofcom, 2016a). Gigaclear and B4RN outperform 
both the national average in rural areas (18%) and the BDUK funded projects, whose take-up ranges 
from 23% to 51.5% in September 2016 (BDUK, 2016). The higher uptake is likely to reflect the 
ability of these providers to both address unsatisfied demand in NGA markets and foster ultrafast 
broadband diffusion in their target communities. On the other hand, their demand-driven approach 
implies that these initiatives are unlikely to invest in those areas where the demand for broadband is 
suboptimal due to either socio-demographic factors or lack of digital literacy.  
Furthermore, niche providers tend to engage in partnerships to access key inputs for their NGA 
projects. The nature and objective of these strategic relationships vary across the four case studies – 
see Table 7. The community-led initiative relies on the engagement of local residents in different 
stages of the projects. In each parish, volunteers act as champions to build consensus around the 
initiative and raise the funds to cover all premises. Local residents are also actively involved in the 
design and roll-out of the networks, to leverage their skills and their knowledge of the local 
geography.  
The involvement of volunteers does not only minimise deployments costs. As such, a collaborative 
process also increases the social acceptance of this infrastructure and the tolerance for disruptions 
related to the rollout of the network. For example, landowners are willing to provide free wayleaves, 
once they understand the positive outcomes of ultrafast broadband for their community. Taking part 
in the project, the locals perceive the network roll-out as an opportunity to contribute to the 
community’s development, thereby enhancing the sense of inclusion and social cohesion. 
On the other hand, the relationships with suppliers and anchor tenants enable the providers to 
specialise in a subset of activities along the value chain. As a result, Cityfibre has focused on the 
provision of passive infrastructure with the local ISPs in charge of retail services, while the 
partnership with Vonage has enabled Gigaclear and B4RN to become fully independent from BT. 
This is consistent with their niche strategy and enabled them to be perceived as a complete alternative 
to both the incumbent and traditional ISPs. 
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Table 7: Key partners for the four case studies 
Provider Partners Input 
B4RN Local communities 
 
Vonage 
Voluntary work, in-depth knowledge of the area, 
free wayleaves 
Voice services 
Cityfibre Local ISPs 
Local authorities 
In-depth knowledge of the local market 
Promotion within their communities 
Gigaclear Broadband campaigners 
Subcontractors, equipment suppliers 
Vonage 
Promotion within their communities 
Technical expertise 
Voice services 
Hyperoptic Developers, property managers Wayleaves and innovative bundles 
 
These strategic relationships activate synergies that create value for both parties. The ISPs 
partnering with Cityfibre can differentiate from other operators relying on FTTC networks and reduce 
their reliance on BT, which is also their main competitor. The local councils can utilise Cityfibre’s 
infrastructure to implement their digital strategies and enrich public services. Even the owners of 
MDUs can benefit from their relationship with Hyperoptic to enhance their value proposition, by 
providing innovative bundles and advanced services to their customers. 
To leverage the existing demand and the strategic relationships in a specific context, all the case 
studies have adopted a modular approach. This implies that each deployment is developed 
autonomously and based on a single geographical unit: a parish for B4RN, a village for Gigaclear, a 
MDU building for Hyperoptic and a city for Cityfibre. Any incremental project is designed and 
implemented in order to minimise the diseconomies of scale and maximise the return on the 
investment, by leveraging the opportunities in each unit. As a result, B4RN deploys its ducts taking 
into account the geography of each parish to minimise the deployment costs, while Cityfibre’s 
networks are routed according to the location of pre-registered and prospective customers.  
This approach also ensures a high level of flexibility, since each project is developed according to 
the demand and the resources existing within the targeted area. Consequently, the niche providers can 
responsively differentiate their commercial proposition and adapt it to the requests of their customers 
and partners. For example, Cityfibre started providing active services to serve also those ISPs 
preferring lit to dark fibre. Hyperoptic, instead, offer its retail services as either a stand-alone product 
or in bundle with the monthly rent, according to the landlords’ preferences. As a result, the four 
providers have been able to successfully expand their footprint, by replicating and adapting their 
model to new niches in the NGA market. 
Since each project focuses on a single area, the niche providers tend to build their infrastructure in 
order to connect all the customers within that unit. Gigaclear’s and B4RN’s deployments usually 
include all the premises in a village or parish to achieve economies in the construction phase. This 
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implies that both providers are aiming at covering 100% of the premises in their targeted 
communities, thereby reducing the scope for further public interventions to bridge the digital divide 
in these areas. 
On the other hand, the coverage of niche providers in the urban areas has so far been limited by 
their scope and focus. Cityfibre is currently delivering FTTH in just York and Bournemouth, though 
its metro networks are meant to be the starting point for the roll-out of fibre in the last mile. The 
commercial success and financial return of the ongoing projects in York and Bournemouth are likely 
to affect the scope and intensity of further FTTH investment within and beyond these cities. 
Despite their overall coverage being limited by their niche strategy, the contribution of alternative 
providers to the development of NGA in the UK has been significant. By investing in pure fibre 
networks, they are leading the provision of ultrafast broadband (delivering a minimum download 
speed of 300 Mbit/s). Furthermore, their entry into the market has pushed the major players to revise 
their investment plans. In some cases, BT allegedly overbuilt the infrastructure deployed by niche 
providers. This has raised concerns about the fairness and efficiency of BT’s behaviour (PRISM, 
2014), especially in those areas where its deployments are subsidised by public funds. Nevertheless, 
these reactions have proved how competitive pressure exerted by niche providers can induce major 
providers to expand the coverage and the capacity of their NGA networks.  
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper shed light on the nature and the strategies of alternative infrastructure providers, 
investing in geographic and commercial niches overlooked by commercial and subsidised initiatives. 
Their deployments contradict the general view that private investment is profitable only in densely 
populated areas and for large-scale providers, since they bring fibre networks where major public and 
private initiatives have failed to fulfil the demand for fast and reliable broadband. 
In fact, the four case study suggest that alternative NGA providers may emerge where unsatisfied 
demand for ultrafast broadband and past experience in broadband development can be leveraged. 
Furthermore, they tend to develop unique business models, based on key partnerships and a modular 
approach, to compensate the diseconomies of their small-scale. All these factors should be taken into 
account by policymakers when planning public intervention to bridge the access divide.  
Currently, state aid is eligible for those areas where NGA is not yet available and commercial 
investments are not expected within three years. As a result, public intervention is based on the 
intentions of existing operators and does not consider the potential entry of new NGA providers. 
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However, the rural case studies suggested that the use of public funds could be minimised by 
encouraging alternative approaches to NGA development where local resources can be leveraged and 
a demand for faster broadband exists. 
Furthermore, the four case studies showed that strategic synergies with local partners may 
counterbalance the small-scale of geographically delimited deployments and increase their take-up. 
Similarly, a more locally focused approach is likely to increase the effectiveness of public 
intervention in promoting digital inclusion. A greater engagement of local stakeholders is desirable 
to maximise the positive outcomes of NGA deployment. 
At this stage, however, the sustainability of niche providers in the long-term remains unclear. 
None of the four case studies is profitable, but this may be consistent with the cost structure and the 
long payback period of NGA investment. On the other hand, financial constraints may limit their 
growth and their competitiveness in the long-term. Furthermore, their small scale may affect their 
ability to replicate the marketing offers of nationwide providers, in terms of pricing and bundle 
strategies, and their effectiveness in dealing with complex procedures, such as State Aid regulation. 
Nevertheless, the four case studies show the potential of niche operators in a capital-intensive 
market such as NGA development. Consistent with their niche strategy, these providers are unlikely 
to become national and challenge the leadership of mass-market ISPs. Nevertheless, their contribution 
to ultrafast broadband development is unambiguous. On the one hand, they are rolling out fibre 
networks in areas otherwise underserved. On the other hand, they are pushing the major players in 
NGA market to revise their plans and shift their focus from superfast to ultrafast broadband. 
In fact, the success of such disruptive initiatives is likely to be affected by the competitive 
responses of major broadband providers and the ability of public institutions to leverage their 
potential. Policymakers across Europe are increasingly aware of niche providers’ contribution to 
NGA diffusion. However, further actions need to be taken to ensure an efficient allocation of public 
resources and minimise competitive distortion in NGA market. Both regulation and public subsidies 
need to be revised in order to take into account the emergence of new players in the NGA market.  
This is likely to require a different approach to public intervention in broadband markets, which is 
still centred on the simplistic juxtaposition between competition in urban areas and market failure in 
rural areas. In fact, the emergence of niche providers in rural areas highlights some shortfalls in the 
State Aid process. Subsidised deployments were unable to fully satisfy the existing demand for faster 
broadband, exacerbating the digital divide in some areas. On the other hand, public intervention 
proved unable to recognise and leverage the potential incentives for private investment in areas where 
the market is supposed to fail. 
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The UK experience shows the potential contribution of niche providers to the development of 
NGA, under the European regulatory framework. On the one hand, policymakers across Europe 
should carefully consider the scope for alternative infrastructure providers in unserved and 
underserved areas. On the other hand, these initiatives can encourage the adoption of innovative 
approaches for the commercial delivery of faster broadband. Further research is, therefore, needed to 
assess the long-term sustainability of these alternative models and their implications for the NGA 
market, in terms of competitive pressure and diffusion of ultrafast broadband. 
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